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While modern theorising on the microfoundation of macroeconomics makes in-
tense use of the representative firm notion, severe objections have been raised. Re-
garded from the history of thought this is the second time that its usefulness is
called into question. The paper presents an old literature which has ended with
the abandonment of the representative firm from competition theory because it
neglects the innovation issue. It shows that its subsequent adoption to macroeco-
nomics suffers from similar flaws. It follows that the representative firm is inap-
propriate for the analysis of modern competitive economies and should be with-
drawn from macroeconomics as well.
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0. Introduction
Since the introduction of the representative firm to economic theory by Al-
fred Marshall in 1891, more than 100 years have passed. During this long period
of time, a lot of arguments have been raised giving either support or opposition
to the concept. In recent years the representative firm has found increasing in-
terest from macroeconomists. Since the beginning of the modern microfounda-
tions literature in the early 1970s, the representative firm or its big bother, the
representative agent, has been made an essential analytical tool for providing
the link between macroeconomics and microeconomics. Within this general de-
bate about microfoundation issues, the microfoundation of business cycle the-
ory has played a prominent role.1
Current practice, however, is far from being beyond dispute. While real
business cycle economists prefer the representativity approach for its formal
elegance critics argue that the representative agent is an inappropriate device
because it hides economic differences between the agents which should not be
discarded from economic theorising.2 Varieties among the agents, such as dif-
ferences of competitive conduct, preferences or revenues, were crucial for un-
derstanding macroeconomic phenomena which were just the outcome of inter-
actions between different individuals. Critics go on asserting that handling
macrovariables as if they were representations of one single isolated macro-
agent lead to „fundamentally erroneous“ results.3 Consequently, the term
‘microfoundation’ is found to be „misleading“ because it does not build macro-
economics on individual behaviour.4 Further, it is concluded that neglect of the
co-ordination issue by applying equilibrium theory to macro-problems pro-
vides „the right answers to the wrong questions“.5 The representative agent is
even found to be a „straightjacket“ which should be torn off.6
This is just an exemplary list of recent criticism of the use of the representa-
tive agent in macroeconomics and business cycle theory. But looking at the
modern microfoundations literature only creates an incomplete picture of the
controversial impact of representative reasoning on economic theory construc-
tion. From a history-of-thought perspective opposition to the representative
agent is nothing new, because there has already been another dispute about the
representative firm between the two World Wars. This dispute has not been
among macroeconomists, because modern macroeconomics did not yet exist at
that time. If the old debate were to be classified according to the modern system
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of economic theories it had to be categorised to the microeconomics branch or,
more precisely, to competition theory. Its attachment to a different theoretical
body might explain why the old literature is not referred to in modern macro-
economic writings despite the fact that it is quite voluminous due to the dura-
tion of the controversy which went on for more than 30 years.
It is the virtue of Hartley’s recent essay to have called the old critique and the
abandonment of the representative agent into memory again.7 The goal of the
present essay is to extend Hartley’s work in two respects. Firstly, it tries to
work out the different theoretical orientation of the old controversy of competi-
tion theorists which arrived at the dismissal of the representative firm from
competition theory more than 40 years before the same claim is raised once
again by modern macroeconomists. Secondly, it then switches the perspective
and looks upon the representative firm problem from an early macroeconomic
point of view in order to find out how and why the second macroeconomic life
of the representative firm started shortly after its abandonment from competi-
tion theory. The paper is written from a Schumpeterian point of view in order
to work out clearly that the double failure of the representative firm is due to its
inappropriateness to capture the role of innovations to be an essential device of
modern competitive conduct. The Schumpeterian orientation of the present pa-
per provides another contrast and supplement to Hartley’s approach who ex-
plicitly takes up a neo-classical position.8
Section 1 starts by demonstrating Marshall‘s notion and use of the concept.
Particular attention will be given to the built-in equilibrium characteristics of
the representative firm. Subsequently, the old representative firm controversy
will be outlined in section 2. Its focal point will be to show how Marshallian
equilibrium thinking comes under increasing pressure from competition theo-
rists who can demonstrate successfully that essential features of modern market
processes cannot be captured by representative reasoning. In Section 3 the
adoption of the concept to early macroeconomics will be discussed. The para-
doxical fate of the representative firm is made up by its two different lives in
two different theoretical bodies. Section 4 presents some concluding thoughts
about this and the advantages that might arise from setting up macroeconomic
theories without the representative firm.
1. Origin and Use of the Term ‘Representative Firm’
The representative firm was first mentioned by Marshall in the second edi-
tion of the Principles of Economics, which was published in 1891. In the preface to
this edition, Marshall indicated that his main interest was focused to „The The-
ory of the Equilibrium of Demand and Supply“ which he presented in Book V of
the Principles. In this chapter he depicted the famous graphical presentation of
the market equilibrium to be the point of intersection of the demand curve and
the supply curve in a price-quantity diagram, which has since then become a
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standard device of microeconomic theory.9 In order to prepare the equilibrium
analysis of Book V, Book IV of the Principles was devoted to some introductory
considerations. One of them concerned the cost curve which Marshall wanted
to analyse by focusing on what he termed to be the ‚normal‘ conditions which
were required for the production of a given quantity of a commodity:
 „We shall have to analyse carefully the normal cost of producing a
commodity, relatively to a given aggregate volume of production; and
for this purpose we shall have to study the expenses of a Representative
producer for that aggregate volume.“10
The notion of the ‚Representative producer‘ was then specified by excluding
what Marshall thought to be unusual or irregular and by focusing instead on
the typical industry-specific characteristics of the manufacturing business:
 „On the one hand we shall not want to select some new producer just
struggling into business,... nor on the other hand shall we want to take
a firm which by exceptionally long-sustained ability and good fortune
has got together a vast business ... But our representative firm must be
one which has had a fairly long life, and fair success, which is managed
with normal ability, and which has normal access to the economies, ex-
ternal and internal, which belong to that aggregate volume of produc-
tion; account being taken of the class of goods produced, the conditions
of marketing them and the economic environment generally.“11
After these preparatory considerations, the equilibrium of supply and de-
mand is then examined in Book V. While in market equilibrium the quantities
supplied exactly match the quantities demanded and all the commodities are
exchanged at the uniform equilibrium price, it is not necessary to assume all
firms to be equal. On the contrary, Marshall attached great importance to the
fact that he wanted to avoid this assumption.12 However, the reason for this
procedure was stated plainly not until 30 years later in a letter to Professor Flux,
in which Marshall criticised Cournot‘s formal analysis for leading to unrealistic
results:
 „My confidence in Cournot as an economist was shaken when I found
that his mathematics ... led inevitably to things which do not exist and
have no near relation to reality. One of the chief purposes of my Wan-
der-jahre among factories, etc., was to discover how Cournot‘s prem-
ises were wrong. The chief outcome of my work in this direction, which
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10 Marshall (1895), p. 397.
11 Marshall (1895), p. 397.
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occupied me a good deal between 1870 and 1890, is in the
‚Representative Firm‘ theory ...“.13
Knowledge of this background reason facilitates both comprehension of
Marshall‘s method as well as interpretation and use of the representative firm.
While the label ‚representative‘ conveys the notion of ‚normal‘ or ‚typical‘, it
keeps in mind at the very same time that there is always a population of differ-
ent firms the analysis of which is merely simplified by focusing on the essential
industry-specific characteristics and by neglecting the individual variations. In
order to provide an illustration of what happens in market equilibrium, Mar-
shall drew upon the famous biological metaphor of the ‚trees in a forest‘:
 „But here we may read a lesson from the young trees of the forest and
their struggle upwards through the benumbing shade of their older ri-
vals. Many succumb on the way, and few only survive; those few be-
come stronger every year, they get a larger share of light and air with
every increase of their height, and at last in their turn they tower above
their neighbours, ... ; but sooner or later age tells on them all ... they
gradually loose vitality; and one after another they give place to others,
which, though of less material strength, have on their side the vigour of
youth“.14
By analogy to a full-grown forest which does not change its outward appear-
ance although a lot of growth and decay takes place simultaneously, commod-
ity markets were also characterised by a specific set of equilibrium features
around which young firms rise and old ones decline:
 „And as with the growth of trees, so it is with the growth of busi-
nesses. As each kind of tree has its normal life in which it attains its
normal height, so the length of life during which a business of any kind
is likely to retain full vigour is limited by the laws of nature combined
with the circumstances of place and time, and the character and stage
of development of the particular trade in which it lies“.15
Therefore, the conception of the representative firm has to be regarded as
Marshall‘s attempt to make the analysis of market equilibria more realistic than
it was before by including the rise and decline of firms which takes place all the
time and which does not stop in equilibrium.
2. The Representative Firm Controversy in the 1920s
Marshall‘s intention to add realism to equilibrium analysis, however, was in
fact merely a conceptional claim which was based only on Marshall‘s intuitive
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knowledge he had accumulated from frequent visits to industrial sites.16 But it
was not based on systematic empirical research into the shape of cost curves or
revenue curves. In the follow-up literature this deficiency of the conception
gave rise to a heated controversy about both the theoretical and empirical fea-
tures of the representative firm. The controversy can be characterised by two
metaphors which were used quite frequently at that time: ‚empty boxes‘ and
‚trees in a forest‘.
2.1. The Start-up Thesis of the Controversy: ‚Empty Boxes‘
The controversy was started by Clapham‘s 1922 essay in which he criticised
current practice of contemporary economists to classify industries according to
the shape of their revenue curves into increasing-return, constant-return and
diminishing-return industries to be theoretical imaginations only which did not
have any empirical foundation.17 Clapham supported his point metaphorically
by walking through a hat factory and discussing the different steps of the pro-
duction process. The ‚boxes‘ stand for three different hat boxes labelled
‚increasing returns‘, ‚constant returns‘ and ‚diminishing returns‘ into which
Clapham figuratively tried to put the raw materials used for hat production ac-
cording to the characteristics of their return curve or cost curve, respectively.18
These boxes, however, had to remain empty, because the knowledge required
for classification of the industrial inputs did not exist.
Clapham gave a set of different reasons for this, many of which were cen-
tered around the innovation issue. Firstly, if products were differentiated, defi-
nition of standard commodities were not possible.19 Secondly, the shape of cost
curves depended on the degree of industrial manufacture of the product. For
instance, the classification of natural products such as coal seemed to be easy
because in every pit the input of resources will yield smaller physical returns of
coal as the exploitation of the natural bed approaches depletion. While this
might be taken as an argument for putting coal into the diminishing-returns
box in the long run, Clapham argued that this were not a relevant phenomenon
in economics which were not concerned with geological time. Thought about in
more humane time dimensions, the improvement of coal-mining technology
may have the contrary effect on the returns curve, because it decreased produc-
tion costs.20 By drawing attention to Marshall’s exclusion of innovations from
economic analysis although they might fundamentally alter the shapes of cost
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18 Clapham (1922 a), p. 306.
19 Clapham (1922 a), p. 306, p. 311.
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curves, Clapham’s essay was in fact a plea not to ignore innovations any fur-
ther.21 Clapham also pointed to the necessity of empirical research into the
shape of cost curves and revenue curves.22
In a reply essay Pigou who had been criticised tried to defend his work. But
he also supported Clapham’s demand for empirical studies and made some
suggestions.23 An important theoretical contribution to the empty-boxes prob-
lem was made by Robertson who argued that the course of the cost curves were
determined by the amount of factor variation which is possible in the respective
production process. In this regard there were a fundamental difference between
agricultural production and industrial production. If one factor were fixed, as it
were the case for soil in agricultural production, additional units of output
could only be yielded at a decreasing rate because the constant factor ap-
proached its absolute capacity limit. As this were fundamentally different to in-
dustrial production, in which each factor could be increased, the distinction be-
tween increasing-cost industries and decreasing-cost industries were equivalent
to the distinction between agriculture and industry.24 In addition, industrial
costs curves were bound to decline due to economies of scale, innovations of
production technology and organisational enhancements. Marshall‘s represen-
tative firm stood for the conditions which established themselves automatically
in competitive equilibrium.25 Thus, Robertson used the economies-of-scale ar-
gument to reconcile Marshall’s equilibrium notion and process innovations.
2.2. The Course of the Debate: ‚Trees in a Forest‘
The empty-boxes dispute stimulated a discussion among economists about
the shapes of cost curves and revenue curves and the appropriateness of the
representative firm as a means of analysis which was continued for more than
20 years. While contributions were made to various aspects, the essential theo-
retical problem was whether the representative firm notion implied a u-shaped
cost curve in order to locate the firm’s position at the lower turning point. Fix-
ing the position would not be possible on a monotonously declining cost curve,
because in this case firms would grow to infinity. Therefore, a lot of discussants
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22 Clapham (1922 a), p. 312.
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ness it has to be mentioned that Pigou tried to promote his conception of the
‘equilibrium firm’ which however did not gain acceptance in the profession.
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Robbins (1928), p. 387; Schumpeter (1954), p. 997.
24 Robertson (1924), p. 17, p. 27.
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presented analyses about the characteristics of curve patterns and points of in-
tersection which were required to establish the competitive equilibrium.26
Schumpeter joined into the discussion in 1928 by presenting a couple of dif-
ferent arguments. First, he argued that industries should not be analysed inde-
pendently from one another, because the rise of input costs in one industry
could be caused by rising prices due to rising demand from another industry
which were growing and required the same input factors. Second, this type of
causal inference had to be distinguished clearly from other types of cost-
increasing effects such as the decreasing physical output of a constant factor,
mentioned by Robertson above.27 This effect, however, were not limited to agri-
cultural production, but were relevant in industrial production as well. Schum-
peters third and theoretically most important argument went to the static char-
acter of the whole consideration. Even the drawing of a diagram such as the
cost curve in price-quantity co-ordinates were implicitly based on the assump-
tion that all the other cost-affecting parameters not included in the diagram re-
mained equal. If the data fringe changed due to innovations, the consideration
had to be stopped and a completely new diagram had to be drawn which were
by principle not comparable to the previous one, even if it looked the same, be-
cause it were based on another set of conditions.28 This were particularly rele-
vant for the case of partial factor variation discussed in literature, which were at
best valid only in the very short run. Schumpeter concluded that this explained
the difficulties of filling the boxes.29
Another argument was brought forward by Young, who said that production
costs were dependent on the size of a market which facilitated the use of spe-
cialised machinery. If markets started growing competitors were compelled to
modernise their production facilities successively in order to keep pace with
demand. This in turn stimulated suppliers of raw materials and machinery to
improve their offerings which again induced similar effects to their respective
input markets. With innovative activities spreading across the whole industrial
sector, the inner logic of modern market system unfolded a dynamic change
which were driven by innovations and the innovative responses to them.30 The
traditional demand-and-supply analysis were not appropriate for modern
competitive processes, because it focused on partial aspects only. Modern
growth were characterised by a continuous process of „industrial differenciation“
which could not be captured by static representative analysis. Marshall‘s repre-
sentative firm, once defined at a certain point in time, loosed its identity im-
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mediately afterwards, because the industry which it were apt to represent, were
itself not a constant item as well.31
In an article frequently cited at that time Robbins explained that the repre-
sentative firm was not a necessary tool for equilibrium analysis and that it was
even superfluous in Marshall‘s own analysis. First, this conclusion was based
on the observation that Marshall made no intensive use his own conception.
This were, second, consistent with equilibrium thinking because all that were
required for equilibrium in the presence of heterogeneous factors were that dif-
ferential rewards corresponded to differential efficiencies. It were therefore
simply not necessary to shift to an imaginary average consideration about firms
as it were unnecessary to introduce representative pieces of land, machines or
workers.32 In addition, and most important in our present context, Robbins
found the representative firm even to be misleading, because it „cloaks the essen-
tial heterogeneity of productive factors - in particular the heterogeneity of managerial
ability - just at that point at which it is most desirable to exhibit it most vividly“.33
Once again, the innovation issue provided a powerful argument against the
applicability of the representative firm. This time it occurred in the shape of the
innovative capabilities of corporate leaders to compete on modern industrial
markets.
In 1930 Keynes summoned a symposium about the representative firm which
in retrospect can be regarded to be the zenith of the controversy.34 The first con-
tribution to the symposium was made by Robertson who argued that the typi-
cal features of an industry could not be revealed by analysing the variety of the
individual cases. Instead of dealing with exceptional events such as the new en-
trepreneur just entering into business Robertson seeked to focus on the average
characteristics of an industry such as the „modal firm“ which might be an ap-
propriate approximation of the overall economic conditions of an industry.
Concerning Marshall‘s trees-in-a-forest metaphor one might compare different
firms to different sorts of trees such as „oaks ... and hawthorns“ which would ex-
ist in all stages of their life cycles as well and which, therefore, might also be
handled by representative considerations. Thus, the representative firm pro-
vided a „fruitful and indeed an indispensable instrument“ for economic analysis.35
Sraffa objected to this proposition by arguing that the existence of an indus-
try equilibrium required an u-shaped course of the cost curve in a price-
quantity diagram, which, however, did not exist in Robertson‘s formal consid-
erations. Therefore, it would not be possible to specify the location of the repre-
sentative firm on Robertson‘s own grounds.36 Further, the notion conveyed by
the trees-in-a-forest metaphor implied a balanced replacement process of new
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and old firms having no affects on the properties of the equilibrium. New firms
entering into a market, however, were precisely not an identical substitution of
old exiting firms, as it were true for trees, because new and old firms necessarily
had to have different cost curves. Therefore, the trees metaphor did by principle
not conform to economic reality. The representative firm, once having been de-
fined, not only would have to be replaced immediately afterwards, but there
would even be no end to this replacement process as long as the cost curve
continued to decline. Since the theory of the representative firm could by prin-
ciple not be made consistent with the facts it set out to explain, Sraffa concluded
that Marshall‘s theory should even be discarded completely.37
Shove‘s contribution to the symposium was an attempt to intermediate be-
tween the two extreme positions. According to Shove, the existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium did not require the individual firms to be in equilibrium as
well. In equilibrium, firm level profits might differ due to different abilities of
the managements as well as due to other factors such as the different stages of
the firms‘ respective life cycles. The only necessary condition for the existence
of a competitive equilibrium was that the firms‘ size distribution were the most
profitable one among all other conceivable distributions so that shifts of output
between different firms did not increase total profits of an industry. Given this
size distribution, the representative firm could be used as an appropriate tool
for a simplified representation of a situation, in which neither economies nor
diseconomies of scale could occur.38
If markets increased, however, this condition could not be met, because ex-
pansion of output required the instalment of new equipment which did not take
place simultaneously and proportionately in all firms. In the general case,
growth rates differed between the firms, and therefore equilibrium growth
were an extremely unlikely and accidental case. As the representative firm re-
quired a very particular set of assumptions which became „less and less common
every day“ it were not an appropriate tool for the analysis of modern market
processes.39 This also applied to the trees-in-a-forest metaphor which were
based on the biological life cycle of an anonymous population. But modern in-
dustries were not characterised by an anonymous population of transitory
firms. Instead, each firm had its own individuality, it followed an idiosyncratic
course in time and continued in existence „more or less indefinitely“. Instead of
drawing a biological analogy of natural decay, Shove drew an analogy to a
„cluster of variable stars, each with its own individuality, magnitude, spectrum and so
on, and each with its own characteristic series of light-fluctuations“. In such a situa-
tion, Shove concluded, it were „impossible to write the characteristic life-story of a
‚typical‘ or ‚representative‘ firm“.40
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2.3. Preliminary end and definite termination of the controversy
The discussion which was continued for years after the symposium, was in-
terrupted by the outbreak of World War II.41 Therefore, Mason‘s contribution
marked a preliminary end in 1939. Mason did not use the term ‘representative
firm’ any more, but referred to the expression ‘market structure‘. This term still
took regard of the firms‘ size distribution, but at the very same time implied an
important widening of the perspective. While the previous discussion about the
course of cost-curves or revenue-curves had been conducted mainly in Clap-
ham‘s initial intention to clarify commodity-specific characteristics, now the
competitive environment of the market as a whole was taken into considera-
tion. Mason criticised current practice of price analysis which focused on firm-
size related factors of price formation only, to arrive at theoretical constructions
that were „irrelevant to the real problems“.42 Real markets could be distinguished
according to their developmental stage and the shifts that occur between the
stages. Mason drew an example from automobile industry which had shifted
from pure price competition to product competition by making annual changes
to the design of their products. Further, as each firm faced a different market
situation, it also pursued different competitive practices which included all
possible forms of price and non-price competition. Likewise, the price policies
of the firms were strikingly divergent over the business cycle.43
All these real world characteristics of competitive conduct had been excluded
from traditional static price analysis, which by then had been conducted merely
theoretically. The denial of Marshallian theorists to tackle with the dynamics of
modern markets is most clearly illustrated by the metaphors they used to illus-
trate their points. Some of them, such as the biological analogies to the trees in a
forest, the oaks and hawthorns or the out-of-earth reference to blinking stars
have already been mentioned. Although many of these illustrations were
strongly criticised by contemporary discussants for their incomprehensibility
and their inappropriateness in an economic setting,44 this list was even ex-
tended by brown and white furs of wild animals45 or the drops of an ocean
wave with the bones of a baby being its most curious highlight.46
Mason’s essay stands out in this respect as well, because it was he who first
presented truly economic examples from modern price and product competi-
tion among industrial enterprises. In addition to the above-mentioned design
competition of car makers he also made references to the market for automobile
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body steel, the gross and retail business for car tires, the tire deal of Ford and
Firestone, and many more. Therefore, Mason’s contribution was a most power-
ful plea to direct attention to the real world and to start doing empirical re-
search into specific market settings and the full range of competitive actions
taken by the enterprises.47 Thus, after 17 years of theoretical dispute this line of
literature got back to Clapham’s initial thesis about the necessity of empirical
research. But this time, the call did not fade away unheeded, but gave rise to the
new branch of industrial economics. Starting with Bain‘s famous book after the
war, a lot of empirical industry studies now at least examined real-world eco-
nomic problems.48
Marshallian economists, however, had not yet been convinced that the use of
the representative firm as an analytical device established theoretical sentences
which had no relevance for modern market processes due to its implicit neglect
of the innovation issue. After the war, they resumed the debate, mainly by re-
peating arguments which had been put forward before. For example, see Max-
well‘s essay, who replied to the critique of neglecting the variety of the agents
that it was exactly Marshall‘s intention to keep variety in mind, because the
representative firm stood for the equilibrium conditions around which individ-
ual firms always rose and declined.49 The innovation argument was also coun-
tered by stressing that innovations had been explicitly excluded by Marshall.
Given this assumption, equilibrium growth would also be covered by the con-
ception. Therefore, it was even concluded that the representative firm was
„necessary to deal with (limited) dynamic change“.50 Hague even went one step be-
yond by trying to complement the representative firm by a Marshallian
„competitive firm“.51 Hague followed this purpose by painstakingly examining
Marshall‘s work, e.g. by comparing different editions of the Principles, and by
even comparing the wording differences of the footnotes, in order to reveal ex-
actly Marshall‘s understanding of the competitive process.
The limitations of such a procedure are apparent: It necessarily arrives at
unclear or even contradictory passages of the texts or at questions the author
had left open either by purpose or unintentionally. More than 60 years after the
publication of the second edition of the Principles, these issues could not be set-
tled any more. Even more than that: the close adherence to what Marshall
‚really‘ meant blocked the view on modern developments, e.g. such as the
emergence of modern forms of non-price competition which did not yet exist
when Marshall wrote the Principles. Consequently, and not surprisingly,
Hague’s attempt to construct a Marshallian competitive firm came to the final
conclusion that empirical studies were required.52 Thus, after 36 years of intense
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theoretical debate the representative firm controversy once again returned to
the message of Clapham‘s 1922 seminal article. In 1958, this line of literature
was definitely terminated.
3. The Adoption of the Representative Firm in Early Macroeco-
nomics
Spoken in modern terms, the representative firm controversy presented in
overview in the previous section would have to be assorted to the micro-
economic branch within the science of economics. Today‘s classification of the
subjects into microeconomics and macroeconomics, however, did not yet exist
when the controversy took place, because at that time the present division of
labour among economists only started to emerge. Although there has been
some earlier work on the separation between the two fields, the formal set-up is
usually attributed to Keynes who distinguished between the „theory of the indi-
vidual industry or firm“ on the one hand, and the „theory of output and employment
as a whole“ on the other hand.53 After some tentative applications of the expres-
sions ‚macro-economic‘ and ‚micro-economic‘ by a few pioneering authors they
were systematically defined by De Wolff only in 1941.54
Having in mind that we are moving around at times when important ar-
rangements of the economic science developed which were most decisive for
the shape of nowadays economic theorising, it appears useful to find out how
Keynes‘ juxtaposition of the „individual“ and the „whole“ was dealt with in the
early macroeconomic literature. The problem which those authors had to solve
concerned the question under which conditions it was permissive to argue in
macroeconomic terms when there was heterogeneity on the micro-level. This is
the core of the aggregation problem which played an instrumental role for the
emergence of macroeconomics as a separate branch of theory. While this line of
literature differed both in its terms and problems from the representative firm
controversy, it goes back to a very similar methodological issue: How can the
enormous variety of real-world observations be handled analytically in order to
establish general theoretical sentences? As we will see the proximity of the is-
sues facilitates adoption of the representative firm to the macroeconomic do-
main despite the fact that is was not made for this purpose by its inventor.
The initial interest of the early aggregation literature was directed to the
derivation of the macroeconomic production function from its microeconomic
counterparts. The start-up contribution of the so-called ‚inter-firm-production-
function-debate‘ was made by Klein in 1946, who criticised current exercise in
business cycle theory of transferring microeconomic equations to the macro-
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economic sphere without making any modifications.55 If micro-theory and
macro-theory were given by the same equations, a set of very strict assumptions
had to be met in order to derive the macroeconomic relation by aggregation of
the micro-economic ones.56 Pu replied that Klein‘s arguments were based on the
assumption that aggregate output had to be independent from the distribution
of the inputs, which were an irrelevant case because real world firms were dif-
ferent. Therefore, Klein‘s aggregates were „monsters“, which were „completely
void of any economic significance“.57 Pu then relaxed the tightness of Klein‘s re-
quirements and allowed for distributions of parameters among different firms
and among different types of inputs.58
Another point was made by May who argued that the macroeconomic pro-
duction function was something qualitatively different which could not simply
be derived mathematically from the individual firms‘ production functions be-
cause the macroeconomic conditions were also dependent on the socio-
economic framework of the whole economy which was more than the simple
total of the individual technological possibilities. This argument favoured the
independent qualities of macroeconomic relations which were to be derived
separately from the microeconomic sphere. Thus, the firms‘ idiosyncrasies were
pushed into the background.59
The inter-firm-production-function debate was the spore of a new line of lit-
erature in which the aggregation problem and the consequences resulting from
the loss of information were examined intensely. An important contribution to
this literature was made by Theil who showed that the coefficients of macro-
equations were always distorted by an aggregation error, because the coeffi-
cients of the underlying micro-equations could not be aggregated by the same
procedure which was used for the aggregation of the micro-data. Further, Theil
showed that the variance explained by an aggregative model had always to be
smaller than the total of the variances explained by the micro-models. In order
to avoid these problems Theil derived a formal set of very strict requirements
which allowed for „perfect“ aggregation, the existence of which, however, could
not be recognised because this required knowledge about the micro-parameters
in their entirety.60 Thus, the aggregative method of economic analysis appeared
to be unsatisfying, because it was burdened with fundamental flaws from the
outset.
                                                
55 Klein (1946), p. 93.
56 For instance, one criterion is the equality of the marginal productivities of the
input factors for both macro- and micro-production function which implies
equal wage shares to prevail in all the micro-equations. See Klein (1946), pp.
94 - 107.
57 Pu (1946), p. 299.
58 For the technical details see Pu (1946), p. 300 - 302.
59 May (1947), pp. 62 - 63.
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This line of reasoning was objected by Grunfeld and Griliches, who argued
that there were not only losses but also gains from aggregation. This were due
to the fact that Theil‘s results were based on the assumption of perfectly speci-
fied micro-equations, which were never possible in reality. If, however, the mi-
cro-equations were always misspecified, the individual errors compensated one
other during aggregation. There existed a trade-off between Theil‘s aggregation
error and the aggregation gain resulting from the misspecification of the micro-
equations. From the omnipresence of unavoidable misspecifications Grunfeld
and Griliches concluded that in praxis the aggregation gains dominated the ag-
gregation losses.61 Therefore, aggregative analysis were a useful means for ex-
plaining average behaviour which could be thought of in terms of Marshall‘s
representative firm.62
Based on this conclusion about the advantages of aggregation gains Grunfeld
and Griliches picked up the representative firm and put it in the macro-
economic tool-box. While the straightforward arguments of Grunfeld and Grili-
ches directly favoured the aggregative method, at the very same time their mes-
sage conveyed the implicit implication that micro-analyses of macroeconomic
problems could be neglected with good reasons because each micro-analysis
would necessarily be affected by the misspecification error and would therefore
necessarily succumb to the corresponding aggregative approach. Agents’ idio-
syncrasies did not matter any more. Thus, Grunfeld’s and Griliches‘ essay pro-
vided in fact two-fold support for the superior performance of representative
reasoning about macroeconomic problems. The outcome was in fact a reincar-
nation of the representative firm in a different theoretical body.
4. The Paradoxical Fate of the Representative Firm
Surprisingly, the adoption of the representative firm by the early macro-
economic literature happened only two years after the last contribution to the
representative firm controversy. As the evaluation of this line of literature has
revealed in section 2 above, the end result of the controversy was the abandon-
ment of the representative firm from competition theory. By finding out that the
static nature of Marshall‘s conception was inappropriate for the analysis of
modern market processes, neo-classical price theory had matured to modern
competition theory which now explicitly addressed the inherent dynamics of
the competitive process, and the role of innovations as a driving force.63
Actually, one would expect that the incorporation of the representative firm
into the macroeconomic theoretical body had taken place after a thorough ex-
amination of the arguments raised against the conception by competition theo-
rists. A mere examination of this literature, however, even would not have been
sufficient, since the reshaping of an analytical tool designed by Marshall to be
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an industry-specific item only - and nothing more - to a genuinely macro-
economic device had required a substantial amount of analytical development
and modification. However, such a literature does not exist. Not only is there
no reference to the representative firm controversy in Grunfeld’s and Griliches’
work, there is even no reference to this literature in aggregation theory for the
subsequent quarter century. Instead, it appears that the representative firm was
transferred to the macroeconomic domain on a purely pragmatic basis only. It
found easy acceptance in the literature due to its intuitive properties, which al-
lowed to insill artificial life into analyses of macroeconomic aggregates which
otherwise were lifeless theoretical abstractions which could not act on their
own.
In addition, as a closer inspection of the mathematical set-up of Grunfeld’s
and Griliches‘ technical arguments reveals, validity of their proofs is not as gen-
eral as it appears to be at first glance. The aggregation-gain argument is based
on a set of micro-equations which are assumed to be identical in both their
functional forms as well as in the sets of the variables applied.64 In such a case
aggregation eliminates specification errors, indeed, and does not hide economi-
cally relevant idiosyncrasies of the agents, because just they are not included in
the formal set-up. Thus, the conclusion that the aggregate equation can be taken
to be a simplified representation for the individual equations is built into the
mathematical framework from the very outset of the analysis.
The assumption of identical micro-equations, however, does not allow for
the sort of variety Schumpeter thought of when he introduced the innovative
entrepreneur into economic theory. The first-mover characteristics of the pio-
neers by which they set themselves apart from their competitors required a
completely different mathematical treatment. By setting up identical equations
for the micro-agents which differ only in the values of their coefficients, the
force which generates phenomena such as growth and cycles which macro-
economic theory sets out to explain are formally excluded from the analysis.
Therefore, it has to be kept in mind what Schumpeter had written about the un-
suitability of the aggregative method already 21 years before Grunfeld’s and
Griliches‘ essay:
 „It is the disharmonious or one-sided increase and shifts within the
aggregative quantity which matter. Aggregative analysis, here, as
elsewhere, not only does not tell the whole tale but necessarily obliter-
ates the main (and the only interesting) point of the tale“.65
He then continued to say that
 „ ... in order to produce effects on aggregates, a factor or event need
not itself be an aggregate or directly act on an aggregate. It follows on
the one hand that, relations between aggregates being entirely inade-
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quate to teach us anything about the nature of the processes which
shape their variations, aggregative theories of the business cycle must
be inadequate, too ...“.66
Consequently, Schumpeter concluded that the representative firm proved to
be „treacherous“, because it covered rather than mended the logical difficulties
which occurred when static thinking collided with dynamic economic phenom-
ena.67 Later, he even criticised Marshall for this „misplaced realism“ in this re-
spect.68
Taken in their entirety, the arguments raised by numerous authors against
the application of the representative firm as a means for the analysis of modern
economic problems were solidly based and forceful in their implications. But as
gets plainly evident from their reference lists, aggregation theorists have neither
considered Schumpeter‘s points nor the arguments raised by other competition
theorists in the course of the representative firm controversy. Instead, the repre-
sentative firm was lifted to the macro-sphere without any modification or adap-
tation to its new field of application. The logical follow-up problems for causal
inference can hardly be assessed: If an equilibrium conception which implicitly
rests on the perfect co-ordination assumption is made the methodological back-
bone for macroeconomic analysis which has been confined by the neo-classical
synthesis to be theorising about co-ordination failures, inherent contradictions
or logical conflicts are beyond control.
By extending the equilibrium approach to macroeconomic theorising, mod-
ern microfoundation literature has, in fact, replaced the neo-classical synthesis
by a uniform equilibrium approach.69 While this has had the unintended side-
effect of healing the logical frictions caused by using an equilibrium conception
in a co-ordination failure context, this has exactly not rendered the representa-
tive firm superfluous. On the contrary, modern new-classical and real-business-
cycle approaches persistently argue in representative terms. Only very recently,
real business cycle theorists have started pushing forward heterogeneous agent
models.70 This new development does indeed go into the right direction. How-
ever, it yet remains to be seen, how far this branch of theory can move away
from its macroeconomic place of birth without loosing its genuine characteris-
tics.
Another logical possibility, thereby being quite a different approach, might
be to argue solely in Schumpeterian terms. By strictly avoiding to step up to
macroeconomic aggregative variables and by arguing instead in variety terms
from the very beginning of the analysis, another form of causal reasoning is
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rendered feasible which does by principle not depend on the representativity
assumption. However, this type of theory, which might be called ‚business cycle
theory without the representative firm’, is the scope of another paper.71
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